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Abstract 
 
Many fish stocks are controlled by fish quotas divided among individual firms. Such 
quota regimes need an enforcement mechanism in order to be effective. Whether or not 
quota management regimes are worth while depends on whether the rents generated by 
such regimes cover their costs. Cost-efficient quota regimes would attain an optimal 
deterrence through minimal control and high fines, but in practice there are likely to be 
socially-determined limits on how high fines could be set. For shared stocks, the optimal 
degree of enforcement in one country depends critically on the degree of enforcement 
achieved by the other countries involved. We analyze these questions for the Northeast 
Arctic cod stock, using data on enforcement of Norwegian fish quotas. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The absence of sole ownership to fish stocks necessitates control of the fishing industry.
1
 
Under open access, individual firms have incentives to deplete fish stocks below their 
rent-maximizing level, possibly to extinction. Over the years these controls have 
increasingly come in the form of catch quotas. To avoid excessive fleet capacity and 
unnecessarily short fishing seasons, overall catch quotas have been divided among the 
firms in the industry and often made tradable. 
 
Unfortunately, individual firms have incentives to overfish their quotas. Even if such 
overfishing leads to lower future rents, this loss is borne collectively by all firms, with 
only a small part being borne by the offending firm in an industry with many firms. 
Management by individual boat or firm quotas will thus be less than fully effective 
without monitoring whether the firms abide by their quotas, followed by suitable 
punishment if they do not. This is a typical situation of choosing whether or not to engage 
in illegal activities. Ever since Becker’s essay on the economics of crime (Becker, 1968), 
economists have tended to look at this as a rational decision where the expected utility of 
criminal behavior is compared to the utility of abiding by the law. 
 
Becker’s approach gives little leeway to moral and other issues often expected to affect 
criminal behavior. In his own words “[I]t is suggested, for example, that a useful theory 
of criminal behavior can dispense with special theories of anomie, psychological 
inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and simply extend the economist’s usual 
analysis of choice” (Becker, 1968. p. 170). While it may be preposterous to dismiss all 
non-economic issues to the margin or beyond, it is highly likely that such issues impact 
criminal behavior differently, depending on the kind of offense involved. As for 
overfishing, it seems likely that such decisions have few moral or non-economic 
overtones and will be influenced predominantly by a rational calculus of economic gain 
and loss. 
 
To our knowledge, Andersen and Sutinen (1985) were the first to apply Becker’s 
approach to the fishing industry. In their paper, enforcement is an integral part of 
fisheries management, and its costs depend on the quantity caught and the size of the fish 
stock. The optimal rate of exploitation depends on enforcement costs, so that both are 
determined simultaneously through maximizing the fishing industry’s contribution to 
social welfare. Anderson and Lee (1986) and Charles et al. (1999) provide further 
theoretical refinements comparing input and output control instruments. A recent 
theoretical contribution is Chavez and Salgado (2005), which considers an ITQ fishery 
where there is imperfect enforcement, dealing specifically with how quota markets might 
affect the incentives to overfish and how the regulatory authorities might avoid negative 
feedback on compliance from quota markets. Over the years, a number of empirical 
investigations of enforcement of fisheries regulations have appeared (Sutinen and 
Gauvin, 1989; Furlong, 1991; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Bodman, Campbell and 
Skinner, 2002), all of which have relied on Becker’s approach. 
 
                                                 
1
 The classic reference on sole ownership is Scott (1955). 
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This paper deals with overfishing of the Northeast Arctic cod stock, in the spirit of 
Becker and Andersen and Sutinen. Fishing firms are assumed to overfish their quotas if 
their rent from doing so in the current fishing period exceeds what they would obtain 
from their own quotas alone, given the probability of being detected and the resulting 
punishment. The capacity to overfish is simply assumed to exist, but one may ask why it 
does so and to what extent. It is highly likely that overfishing capacity depends on the 
effectiveness of enforcement, so that lax enforcement will generate incentives to invest in 
such capacity; without any enforcement at all we would probably end up in a situation 
similar to open access. We shall not pursue these questions here, but concentrate on the 
question how much loss a given capacity to overfish will produce and what are the 
implications for the enforcement activity. 
 
One question we shall pursue in some detail is the implications of the cost structure in the 
industry for overfishing. By cost structure we mean whether or not the unit cost of fish 
caught is sensitive to the size of the exploited stock. One popular approach is the 
Schaefer production function, which implies that the cost per unit of fish caught is 
inversely proportional to the stock size. Another possibility at the opposite end of the 
spectrum is that the unit cost of fish is independent of the stock size. We shall examine 
both of these. It turns out that the implications for overfishing are quite different in these 
two polar cases. 
 
Enforcement costs are seen as arising from activities that affect the probability of 
detecting overfishing. We assume that this probability depends only on the enforcement 
activities and is independent of the quantity caught. Furthermore it is always possible to 
find a suitable combination of enforcement and fine to ensure full compliance. Hence the 
optimal overall quota is independent of enforcement costs; in this we depart from 
Andersen and Sutinen (1985). We do not consider any feedback from quota markets 
(Chavez and Salgado, 2005), as leasing of fish quotas is not permitted in the case at hand, 
even if there is a restricted long-term transferability of quota allocation rights. 
 
We begin (Section 2) by presenting the theoretical framework. In Section 3 we move on 
to a simplified empirical model of the fish stock under study. This is an aggregate 
biomass model with annual recruitment to the stock where stock growth is partly stock-
dependent, but also governed by random, environmental effects. Recruitment, which 
apparently is only weakly or not at all related to the size of the stock, is determined by a 
random effect but serially correlated. The fishery is regulated by global quotas set on the 
basis of a target exploitation rate, taken to be rent-maximizing. 
 
Next (Section 4) we consider the rent loss from overfishing in the absence of 
enforcement, for various constellations of capacity to overfish and costs of fishing. We 
then (Section 5) consider enforcement activities; how much enforcement would be 
worthwhile, and what would be the appropriate fine for any given level of enforcement. 
 
The said calculations are carried out for the stock as a whole, as if there was only one 
regulatory authority. In reality the stock is shared evenly between two countries, Norway 
and Russia. It is natural, then, to ask whether enforcement by one country makes sense if 
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the other does not enforce its own quotas. This is the subject of Section 6, and the answer, 
not surprisingly perhaps, is no. 
 
Finally (Section 7) we ask whether the Norwegian enforcement activities would be 
reasonable, provided that the other part enforces its quotas likewise. We provide a rough 
estimate of the cost of the probability of detecting overfishing and compare the fines 
meted out in a number of court cases involving overfishing to what would be an 
appropriate deterrent. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
We assume a price-taking, profit-maximizing firm. To maximize profits, marginal cost 
(C) must be equal to price (p): 
 
(1) ( , )p C q S  
 
Marginal cost will depend on the quantity of fish caught (q) and, usually, on the size of 
the fish stock (S) as well. The larger the fish stock, the lower the marginal cost is likely to 
be, all else equal. The larger the fish stock, the more dense it is likely to be, so more fish 
will get entangled in nets or be caught by trawls per unit of time, or the more easily 
suitable concentrations of fish will be found. 
 
We shall consider a management regime where the firm is allowed to catch a certain 
quantity of fish, q , within a certain period of time, referred to as quota. In case this is 
less than the quantity that equalizes price and marginal cost (Equation [1]), the firm will 
have an incentive to exceed its quota. If quotas are enforced, there will be a certain 
probability that a quota-exceeding firm will be found out and punished for its violation. 
The punishment, which we shall assume is a fine, could be related to by how much the 
firm’s quota is exceeded, but we shall for simplicity disregard that and assume that there 
is a lump sum fine depending only on whether or not the quota has been exceeded.
2
 
Denoting the given fine by F and the probability of detection by a, the firm will 
maximize 
 
(2)      
0
,
q
q pq C x S dx K aF q q       
 
where F>0 and given if q q and zero otherwise, while K denotes fixed costs.3 To ensure 
that the firm stays within its quota limit, it is necessary that 
                                                 
2
 It would not be entirely correct to characterize fines for overfishing in Norway as lump sums, but they are 
certainly not proportional to the catch value or amount of fish caught beyond quota (see Table 9 below for 
some cases that have gone to court). There exists a legal authorization for confiscating catches and fishing 
gear, but this is not much used; in the period 1997-2004 such confiscations amounted to less than 0.1 
percent of the catch value (Directorate of Fisheries, 2006). 
3
 Note that the S (the stock level) is not constant as we integrate from 0 to q, as any fishing reduces the 
stock, but this is beyond the control of the individual firm. As we integrate over q we implicitly assume a 
simultaneous change in S given by the fishing patterns of all firms in the industry. 
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(3)    
*
*
0 0
, ,
q q
pq C x S dx pq C x S dx aF      
 
where q
*
 is the catch volume that would satisfy (1). Because of the lump sum character of 
the fine it pays to overfish to the point where the marginal cost of fish equals the price. 
To avert overfishing the gain from exceeding one’s quota must be less than the expected 
fine for doing so. 
 
One important thing to note from (3) is the trade-off between the size of the fine and the 
probability of detection. Since the latter depends on costly enforcement activity while the 
fine is primarily a monetary transfer, the most efficient solution is to impose a very high 
fine and use a minimum of enforcement activity. However, there are likely to be social 
limits to how high the fine could be set, such that it could not be too far out of line with 
the offense committed. There could also be real social costs of very high fines; such fines 
might seriously reduce the economic options of those who have to pay the fine. 
 
Fisheries management measures such as quota control are put in place to improve the 
future profitability of the fishery. Under the worst of circumstances, such control could 
even be necessary to ensure the future viability of the fish stock. The economic benefit of 
quota control and the necessary enforcement can be evaluated by intertemporal 
bioeconomic models, such as the one to be presented below. At this point we may note 
that the harmful effects of overfishing will depend critically on the effect of the stock on 
the marginal cost of fishing. Differentiating (1), with p constant, yields (subscripts denote 
partial derivatives): 
 
(4) 0S
q
Cdq
dS C
    if 0SC   
 
that is, a larger stock will entice the firm to fish more if it lowers the marginal cost of 
fishing, all else equal. But this does not necessarily mean stronger incentives to overfish. 
Usually catch quotas are set on the basis of stock assessment in such a way that the quota 
rises with the stock and vice versa. Denoting the quota-setting rule by G(S), overfishing 
will change as a consequence of an increasing stock as follows: 
 
(5) S
q
Cdq dq
G
dS dS C
     
 
Since G’>0, overfishing will fall if the stock increases, unless the marginal cost of fishing 
is sufficiently sensitive to the size of the fish stock (-CS is sufficiently large). As an 
example, consider the case where the catch quota is a certain fraction of the stock, 
q kS . We then get 
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(5’) 
El
1
El
S S
q q
Cdq dq
k k
dS dS C
 
       
 
 
 
where El is the elasticity of the marginal cost function at the point q q . If the marginal 
cost function is less sensitive to the stock size than to the quantity caught, a decline in the 
fish stock will lead to overfishing, the reference situation being one where there was none 
to begin with and there is not sufficient deterrence to overfishing. 
 
That overfishing will increase if the stock declines is a particularly undesirable situation. 
The smaller the stock, the less able it is to withstand excessive exploitation. The risk of 
depleting it below a possible minimum level of viability will be all the greater. This is 
what happens if the marginal cost of fishing is insensitive to, or independent of, the size 
of the stock. This is a variation on a theme well established in the literature; the only 
thing that protects an open access fish stock from extinction is that the cost per unit of 
fish rises sufficiently as the stock is depleted. The opposite situation where overfishing 
increases with the stock is much less of a problem, even if undesirable, as a larger stock is 
better able to withstand overexploitation. 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
Empirical management models of the Northeast Arctic cod are of the Beverton-Holt type, 
i.e., age-structured. For our purposes it appears sufficient, and much simpler, to employ a 
biomass model, where the stock (X) at the beginning of each year depends on recruitment 
(R) to the stock each year and the stock less fishing (Y) the previous year: 
 
(6)    
2
1 1t t t t t tX R a X Y b X Y       
 
Data on these variables were taken from ICES (2007). Table 1 shows the results of 
estimating the parameters a and b.
4
 The model is capable of reproducing the development 
of the stock rather well, as illustrated in Figure 1. The simulation in Figure 1 takes the 
initial stock (1946) as given and then updates it according to the parameters in Table 1, 
the estimated recruitment each year, and the fraction of the stock that is caught each 
year.
5
 
 
As is evident from Figure 1, the stock fluctuates considerably over time. These 
fluctuations are generated by fluctuations in recruitment. There is also a strong serial 
correlation in recruitment (cf. Table 2),
6
 but apparently only weak or no relation at all 
                                                 
4
 The estimation procedure is OLS with the “robust” option, which corrects for heteroscedasticity. The 
Breusch-Pagan test soundly rejects homoscedasticity, and as we shall see later, the residuals from the 
regression are approximately lognormally distributed. 
5
 For further details on the model, see Hannesson (2007); here the data have been updated in accordance 
with ICES (2007), which had a minimal effect on the estimates. 
6
 Also here the estimation procedure is OLS with the robust option. As we shall see later, the residuals from 
the regression are approximately lognormally distributed, and the Breusch-Pagan test rejects 
homoscedasticity. 
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between recruitment and the size of the spawning stock, as indicated by Figure 2. After 
accounting for the serial correlation in recruitment, the residual recruitment is 
approximately lognormally distributed, after a suitable transformation,
7
 as shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Results of estimating the coefficients in Equation (1), with a constant (a0) added, from data for 1946-2005. 
Significance at the 1 percent level is denoted by **. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. The numbers in 
the last row are estimates without a constant and used in the paper. 
 
a0 a b R
2
 D-W statistic 
71.4 
(0.82) 
1.4658
**
 
(10.96) 
0.000121
**
 
(3.07) 
0.94 2.26 
 1.558 0.000145   
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Figure 1: Actual and simulated development of the Northeast Arctic cod stock. 
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 The residual recruitment is Rt - a0 + a1Rt-1 + a2Rt-2. After taking logarithms we adjust the mean so that the 
absolute value of the logarithm of the highest and lowest disturbance is the same. The resulting distribution 
is shown in Figure 3. 
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Table 2 
 
Results of estimating the equation Rt = a0 + a1Rt-1 + a2Rt-2 +a3Rt-3.  Significance at the 1 (10) percent level is 
denoted by **(*). Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
 
a0 a1 a2 a3 R
2
 (adj.) 
132.4** 
(4.52) 
0.6407** 
(3.301) 
-0.2823* 
(-1.87) 
 0.29 
144.4** 
(4.74) 
0.6160** 
(3.11) 
-0.2279 
 (-1.32) 
-.0863 
(-1.13) 
0.28 
 
 
The growth of the existing stock is also influenced by random environmental events. The 
random fluctuations in growth are given by the residuals in (6) and turn out to be 
approximately lognormally distributed, after a transformation similar to the one applied 
to the random disturbances in recruitment (Figure 4). There is no significant serial 
correlation in the growth disturbances. 
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Figure 2: Recruitment (biomass of 3 years old fish) and spawning stock 3 years earlier (ths. tonnes). 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the transformed disturbances (x) to a serially correlated recruitment compared with 
a normal variable. 
 
 
To investigate the effects of overfishing, we assume that annual quotas are set on the 
basis of a constant rate of exploitation that maximizes the present value of rents in the 
fishery. We then look at the net present value of rents with and without enforcement. The 
stock is simulated 2000 times over a 100 year time horizon for given starting values by 
drawing random variables that influence recruitment and stock growth each year.
 8
 The 
comparison between overfishing and adherence to quotas is made for the same drawings 
of the random variables over each 100-year period, whereafter expected values are taken 
over the number of simulations. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of the transformed disturbances (x) to the growth equation compared with a normal 
variable. 
 
 
4. THE LOSS FROM OVERFISHING 
 
In Section 2 above we presented a theoretical framework for the analysis of overfishing, 
focusing on the importance of the dependence of marginal costs on the size of the fish 
stock. In the absence of empirically well-founded marginal cost functions for the 
Norwegian fishing fleet, we shall use two stylized cost functions which bring to the fore 
the critical importance of how costs depend on the fish stock. One is based on the well-
known Schaefer production function and implies a strong dependence of the marginal 
cost of fish on the size of the stock:
 9
 
 
(7) Y EqS  
                                                 
8
 The starting value for the stock in each case is set close to the average standing stock with a sustained 
exploitation at the optimal level. 
9
 Another possibility would be a weaker stock-dependence than in (2), such as Y = EqS
b
, 0 < b < 1, but we 
shall not pursue that matter further here. 
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where Y is the catch of fish, E is fishing effort and S is the fish stock. With a constant cost 
per unit of effort, this leads to the following expression for the rent (p) in year t: 
 
(8)    ln lnt t t tp X S c X S      
 
where p is the price of fish, which we will normalize at unity, c is a cost parameter which, 
with p = 1 and q = 1, is equal to the break-even level of the stock, X is the stock in the 
beginning of the year, and S is the stock left after fishing.
10
  
 
Identifying E with the number of fishing vessels used for normal operating time per year, 
their capacity to catch fish will depend on the size of the stock. In the absence of 
regulations, the stock would be depleted to the break-even level c. A regulation which 
aims at always catching a given share k
*
 of the stock would automatically be satisfied if E 
is determined as E
*
 = k
*
/q and given that all boats are used for normal operating time. But 
if E exceeds this value, either because there are more boats than necessary or the boats 
are used more intensively, overfishing in terms of tonnes will be proportional to the stock 
size, for any given amount of excessive effort. We shall take the somewhat crude 
approach that the capacity to overfish is a given percentage of what would be needed to 
capture the optimal quota and will always by fully used, except that fishing will stop if 
the stock is reduced to the break-even level.
11
 
 
The other cost function we shall consider is one where the marginal fishing cost is 
constant up to a certain catch volume, whereafter it becomes vertical, and independent of 
the size of the fish stock. We then get the following expression for the rent: 
 
(9)  v fp c Y c N    , Y qN  
 
where cv is variable cost per unit of fish, cf is the fixed cost per boat, with the catch being 
proportional to the number of boats (N) if fully used. The implications for overfishing are 
radically different under this assumption. Suppose that the stock is controlled by a target 
catch. The target catch would in all probability be a rising function of the stock size; two 
possible management rules that would lead to that outcome are a target rate of 
exploitation (such as the k
*
 above) and a target escapement (target stock to be left behind 
after fishing). In this case the degree of overfishing would be inversely related to the 
stock. Suppose that the stock is controlled by a target exploitation rate and that we have 
exactly the right number of boats to catch the fish we are allowed to take when the stock 
is at a normal level. But when the stock is below normal because of adverse 
environmental circumstances the existing boats could catch more fish, and since the 
marginal cost of fishing is independent of the stock size the boats would, in the absence 
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 In this formulation, growth and natural mortality are assumed to take place after fishing, for convenience. 
11
 This implies a linear cost function of fishing, until the capacity limit is reached, at which it becomes 
vertical. As the stock is depleted the marginal cost line drifts upwards, and fishing becomes uneconomical 
when the break-even stock level has been reached. The break-even level will be determined by variable 
costs and would thus be below the c-parameter if the latter includes fixed costs, but we shall not pursue that 
matter further here.  
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of any controls, be fully used, the catches of fish would be the same as otherwise, and the 
overfishing would be greater the smaller the stock is. 
 
The loss from overfishing stems from reducing the stock to a lower level than otherwise 
would be the case, leading to lower future rents, given that the set quotas maximize the 
present value of aggregate rents. Consider, first, the Schaefer case (7) and let the stock be 
controlled by a target exploitation rate k
*
 maximizing the present value of rents. If we 
have more boats than we need to take the stipulated share of the stock, the boats will 
overfish their quotas by a certain percentage, except that they would never deplete the 
stock below the break-even level (c). 
 
Running the model of Section 3 with and without overfishing and ignoring enforcement 
produces the results in Table 3. Overfishing capacity of 10 percent results in only a 
moderate reduction in rents, of the order of 1-2 percent, while overfishing capacity of 50 
percent reduces rents by 20-30 percent, depending on fishing costs. The table also shows 
the average size of the stock, with and without overfishing.
12
 Ignoring fishing costs the 
stock is reduced by about one-half by a 50-percent overfishing, but the reduction in total 
catches is only about 20 percent, because (i) there are diminishing returns to increasing 
the stock up to the maximum sustainable yield level; (ii) recruitment is unrelated to the 
stock size, and (iii) both recruitment and stock growth are affected by environmental 
factors unrelated to stock size. The stock reduction due to overfishing becomes less as the 
cost rises; 50-percent overfishing reduces the stock by only about 10 percent in the 
highest cost case in Table 1 (c = 2500), but by almost 30 percent in the intermediate case 
(c = 1400). High cost limits the effect of overfishing, because there will be more years 
than otherwise in which it is not profitable for the fishermen to overfish at full capacity, 
as this would reduce the stock below its break-even level (c). This protective effect of 
high costs leads to lesser loss of rent in the high cost case than in the intermediate case, or 
20 percent as against 30 percent, compared with optimal fishing. The two cases with 
positive costs reported in Table 3 represent an average rent of about 50 versus 25 percent 
of the gross catch value. 
 
Table 3: Percent loss of present value of rents due to overfishing. Average stock in parentheses. Discount 
rate: 5 percent. 
 
c k
*
 Overfishing capacity (%) 
10 25 50 
2500 0.15 (3672) 1.1 (3591) 6.9 (3470) 19.8 (3316) 
1400 0.22 (3216) 1.8 (3047) 10.1 (2762) 32.9 (2347) 
0 0.30 (2505) 1.1 (2219) 6.4 (1783) 19.2 (1195) 
 
 
The zero cost case in Table 3 produces an exploitation rate that is optimal, given that the 
unit cost of fish is constant and just a given share of revenue, provided the market price is 
constant as well. Fixed costs add a slight complication. With costs that have to be paid 
whether or not a boat is used for fishing, it becomes an optimization problem in its own 
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 Note that the starting value is the same in both cases, so the long-term stock reduction caused by 
overfishing is somewhat greater than the numbers in Table 1 indicate. 
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right to determine the right number of boats if the allowable catch varies from year to 
year. Even if the target rate of exploitation is constant, the allowable catch will not be 
constant if the stock varies for environmental reasons, and the higher the fixed cost of 
boats the less rewarding it will be to invest in fishing capacity that can take large but 
infrequent catches. 
 
The average annual catch with an exploitation rate of 0.3 (last line in Table 3) is about 
750 (thousand tonnes). Assigning alternative values to cv and cf  produces the optimal 
capacity shown in Table 4. When determining these cost parameters we considered the 
costs of the Norwegian trawler fleet and found that in the period 1998-2006 the variable 
costs varied between 75 and 90 percent of revenues, while fixed costs varied between 18 
and 31 percent.
13
 Cost parameters in the higher end of these ranges produce an 
unprofitable fishery, but cost parameters at or below the lower bound result in positive 
rents (last two lines in Table 4). For comparison we also include still lower cost 
parameters; as there still is some overcapacity in the Norwegian trawler fleet, the cost 
parameters of an optimal fleet are likely to be lower than the actual values in recent years. 
 
The lowest cost parameters in Table 4 produce a very significant difference in the present 
value of rents with and without overfishing; the first row shows that the rent with optimal 
fishing would be about twice that with overfishing.
14
 The reason is that overfishing 
totally depletes the stock at some point within the 100 years time horizon. This happens 
even if the fleet capacity is only about 3 percent greater than the average annual quota 
(770 as against 750). The permitted quota often is less than this, because of adverse 
environmental conditions, and as soon as the returning stock falls short of the capacity to 
fish it will disappear, there being no decline in the catch per unit of effort that would 
provide protection in the form of declining profitability of overfishing. As the cost 
parameters become greater the difference between the rents with and without overfishing 
declines; the bottom line in Table 4 shows that rents are “only” about 30 percent higher 
without overfishing (280 versus 214) The reason is that in this case the fleet capacity is 
well below the average permitted quota (690 against 750). There will thus be much fewer 
years in which the permitted quota falls short of the capacity to fish, and depletion of the 
stock is less likely to happen, or will in any case happen later than with lower costs. 
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 These figures are taken from the annual cost and earnings studies carried out by the Directorate of 
Fisheries, except that we have set fixed costs equal to depreciation plus 5 percent of the replacement value 
of the boats, which is well above book value. 
14
 This difference is somewhat exaggerated, as the model assigns fixed costs to the entire 100-years time 
horizon irrespective of when the stock goes extinct, but some capital loss would in any case be involved if 
the stock crashes. 
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Table 4: The loss from overfishing if the unit cost of fish is insensitive to the size of the stock. Total quota  
30 percent of the stock. 
 
cv cf Optimal capacity Average stock Present value of rent 
    Optimal fishing Overfishing 
0.6 0.15 770 2762 3745 1993 
0.75 0.15 740 2886 1470 922 
0.8 0.15 720 3020 723 505 
0.75 0.2 720 3036 716 428 
0.8 0.18 690 3194 280 214 
 
5. ENFORCEMENT 
 
Would it be worthwhile to enforce quotas? Enforcement involves two steps. First, the 
authorities must put in place a mechanism that causes overfishing to be detected with 
some probability. This is a costly activity and should not be undertaken unless it costs 
less than the savings of rents that it generates. Second, once detected, those who exceed 
their fishing quotas must be punished so that overfishing is made unprofitable, in terms of 
expected profits. As mentioned in Section 2, these punishments will be treated here as 
pure transfers, i.e., they have no real costs for either of the parties, which is largely but 
not entirely true; severe punishments, even if only monetary, may prevent those who are 
being punished from engaging in legal and gainful economic activity.
15
  
 
Let us now assume that the cost of the probability of detecting overfishing is linearly 
related to the probability generated (in reality these costs are likely to be rising, but the 
proportionality assumption suffices to illustrate some important points). Rent with 
enforcement will be net of these enforcement costs. Following the economic theory of 
criminal behavior, the fishermen are assumed to decide whether or not to overfish on the 
basis of expected profit per fishing trip, where the expected fine for overfishing (fine 
times the probability of being detected) is subtracted from the profits with overfishing. 
Since all fishermen are assumed to be identical, all will either overfish or stick to their 
quotas. This relieves us from explicitly modeling fishing trips, and so we consider 
overfishing and fines for the entire fleet on an annual basis. 
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 In is tempting to also include the costs of pursuing a case through the court system, but if the fine is made 
sufficiently high to deter all illegal activity such costs would be avoided. 
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Table 5: Consequences of enforcement. Overfishing capacity (percent of legal quotas): 25; probability of 
detection: 12 percent; enforcement cost per unit probability: 150; c = 1400. 
 
 
Fine 
Years with 
overfishing 
Gain/loss 
(%) 
Catch 
(‘000 
tonnes) 
Overfishing 
(‘000 
tonnes) 
Gain per 
year due to 
overfishing 
0 99.9 -5.8 760 152 50 
200 94.5 -3.9 761 147 53 
400 71.7 2.5 758 120 64 
600 34.6 9.1 739 64 82 
800 7.6 10.4 717 16 104 
1000 0.5 10.1 708 1 126 
1200 0.0 10.0 708 0 148 
 
 
Table 5 illustrates the effect of the fine, for the Schaefer function.
16
 If there were no fine 
and no deterrence the enforcement would only mean costs without any benefits, and the 
expected rent per year net of enforcement costs would be less than without any 
enforcement. As the fine increases, overfishing becomes less profitable, and there are 
fewer years with overfishing. The rent gain per year of overfishing (last column in Table 
5) is always higher than the expected fine (12 percent of the first column in Table 5), but 
the higher the fine the fewer the years when overfishing is profitable.  A fine of 1200 
would virtually eliminate the overfishing (some simulations produce the odd year of 
overfishing, which disappear in the rounding off, as the second column in Table 5 shows 
years of overfishing per simulation). It takes a fine of about 300 to make enforcement 
worthwhile, but overfishing would occur about 80 percent of the time, and overfishing 
per year would amount to more than 15 percent of the catch per year. With a high enough 
fine to deter all overfishing (1200) the gain would be about 10 percent of the rent.
17
 Note 
that in all cases the costs of enforcement are the same, so it would make sense to set the 
fine as high as possible, unless it would contradict social norms that the fine should be in 
relation to the damage caused. 
 
Still sticking with the Schaefer function and the same cost parameters as in Table 5, 
Table 6 shows the gain in rent per year from setting the fine high enough to fully prevent 
all overfishing, for different levels of probability of detection. The table illustrates two 
points. First, there is the trade-off between enforcement activities and the fine for 
infractions. Less enforcement (lower probability of being detected) can have the same 
deterrence as greater enforcement if it carries a higher fine. A fine of 1600 would be 
necessary if the probability of being caught is only 10 percent, while only a quarter of this 
would be sufficient if the probability is 40 percent. Since a higher probability means more 
costly enforcement it would be desirable to have little enforcement and a high fine, but 
this, as already stated, may run counter to norms stipulating a correspondence between 
                                                 
16
 The probability assumed and the enforcement cost correspond to our findings below about the Norwegian 
enforcement activities. The value of the fishing cost parameter c implies rents net of enforcement costs of 
50 percent of catch value on the average. 
17
 Because of rounding-off of the optimal exploitation rate, some overfishing (2 percent) would in fact be 
optimal. 
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the damage done and the fine. The expected rent in the fishery is about 360 per year, and 
the gain from preventing overfishing with a 10 percent probability of detection would be 
about 11 percent. The necessary fine in this case (1600) is more than four times the 
expected rent and thus many times greater than the loss from overfishing. Substantial 
gain could, however, be obtained with a lower fine, even if it would not eliminate all 
overfishing. 
 
Table 6: Gain or loss from enforcement, in percent of expected rent. Overfishing capacity (percentage): 25; 
enforcement cost per unit probability: 150; c = 1400. 
 
Probability 
of detection Fine Gain (%) 
0.1 1600 11.0 
0.2 800 6.2 
0.3 533 1.3 
0.4 400 -3.5 
 
The other point illustrated by Table 6 is that if there is a limit to how high the fine for 
overfishing can be set, enforcement that totally eliminates the probability of getting away 
with overfishing does not necessarily make sense, unless the enforcement activities are 
cheap enough. Here it would not make sense to raise the probability of discovering 
infractions much beyond 30 percent. With a 40 percent probability of getting caught there 
is a small loss from the enforcement activity, even if the fine is high enough to eliminate 
all overfishing. 
 
6. ENFORCEMENT WITH TWO PARTIES 
 
The Northeast Arctic cod stock is managed jointly by Norway and Russia. An overall 
quota is split equally between the two countries, after setting aside a small amount for 
third countries. For a number of years the Norwegian authorities have been concerned 
that the enforcement of the Russian quotas is not effective. The problem has been 
acknowledged by the Russian side, but there is no agreement on how serious it is. In any 
case, the question of incomplete enforcement by one side raises the question whether 
effective enforcement by the other side would be worth while. 
 
We shall analyze this in the Schaefer framework, assuming that the overall quota is split 
evenly between the two countries and thus ignoring the portion going to third countries. 
Both countries are assumed to have the same possibility to overfish their quotas and to 
face identical price and costs. The question then is whether it would be worthwhile for 
one country to enforce its quotas when the other country does not. 
 
There are two ways of modeling the fishing costs at this level of aggregation. One is by 
assuming that both countries fish their quotas simultaneously, with the overfishing 
country using a greater fishing capacity. The other option is to assume that both fish with 
the same capacity, but that the overfishing country continues fishing after the other has 
taken its quota. These two alternatives lead to the following cost functions, assuming that 
16 
 
both have the same cost parameters (subscripts c and n denote the complying versus non-
complying country): 
 
(10a)  ln lncc t t
c n
Y
C c X S
Y Y
 

   ln lnnn t t
c n
Y
C c X S
Y Y
 

 
 
(10b)   ,0.5 ln ln 2c t t c tC c X X Y  
      , ,0.5 ln ln 2 ln 2 lnn t t c t t c t tC c X X Y c X Y S       
 
The case where both fish simultaneously (10a) produces the greatest benefit for the 
overfishing country and the lowest benefits for the complying country, but the difference 
is not large. 
 
Table 7 shows the rent resulting from various combinations of compliance and no 
compliance, in percent of the rent with compliance (Vc), in the absence of enforcement 
costs.
18
 It is clearly profitable for one country to overfish if the other country does not 
retaliate by also overfishing, as Vn,c > Vc.  Taking enforcement costs into account would 
make this a still more profitable strategy.
19
 There are diminishing returns to overfishing, 
however; the largest gain is achieved at an overfishing rate of 30 percent. It is not 
necessarily true that the complying country would come out better by also overfishing, as 
Vn < Vc;n in case the overfishing is severe enough, but it is certainly likely, as we have not 
taken into account the enforcement costs incurred by the complying country, which 
would have to be subtracted from Vc;n. Ignoring enforcement costs, compliance is the best 
response by one country to overfishing by the other (Vc,n > Vn) if overfishing exceeds 30 
percent. Since both countries get the same Vn if neither one complies, there is some 
incentive for the offending country to mend its ways in case the other one retaliates by 
also overfishing; at an overfishing rate of 50 percent the payoff is only about two-thirds 
of what it would be if both complied. These results could, however, be turned around by 
high enough costs of enforcement; this could produce Vc < Vn, and in that case both 
countries would be better off by not enforcing the quotas. 
 
                                                 
18
 The numbers in Table 7 pertain to the case where the non-complying country continues fishing after the 
other has stopped. The difference between the two cases increases with the degree of overfishing; the 
bottom entries for Vc,n and Vn,c would be 71.9 and 107.1 instead of 75.3 and 104.4. 
19
 This is as expected. In Hannesson (2007) it is shown that it is a profitable strategy for Russia to overfish 
her quota if Norway does not retaliate, and vice versa. 
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Table 7: Present value of rents, in percent of value without overfishing. Vc: value with compliance; Vc,n: 
value for the complying part if the other does not comply; Vn,c: value for the non-complying part if the 
other part does comply; Vn value without compliance. Enforcement costs are ignored. 
 
Percent 
overfishing Vc Vc;n Vn;c Vn 
10 100 95.4 103.5 98.2 
20 100 90.6 105.8 93.4 
30 100 85.7 106.8 85.8 
40 100 80.6 106.3 76.3 
50 100 75.3 104.4 67.1 
 
 
7. ENFORCEMENT IN NORWAY 
 
Monitoring and enforcement of fisheries regulations in Norway is carried out by the 
Coast Guard and the Directorate of Fisheries. The Coast Guard is responsible for controls 
at sea, while the Directorate of Fisheries has inspectors who control boats while in 
harbor. There is some cooperation and synchronization of effort between the two. The 
controls pertain to the fishing gear (e.g., undersized meshes in nets), catches of 
undersized fish, and fishing over quota. Monitoring of catches involves checking whether 
the entries in the logbook correspond to the actual catch (underreporting in the logbook 
would be in preparation of underreporting landings), and whether the landings and 
transactions reports agree with the logbook and landings. The focus of this paper is on 
overfishing of quota, and it is our impression that this is the major problem with respect 
to the Northeast Arctic cod. This is certainly the case if we include the Russian 
overfishing. 
 
The overfishing of the Norwegian quota is estimated to have been between 3 and 10 
percent of landings (3-11 percent of quota) in the years 2003-2005 (Riksrevisjonen, 2007, 
p. 26). Needless to say, the capacity to overfish could be much greater than this, 
depending on how effective a deterrent the control activity is. The Russian overfishing is 
in all likelihood much greater. Norwegian sources estimate this at 40-100 percent of the 
Russian quota for the period 2003-2005 (Riksrevisjonen, 2007, p. 28). The Russian 
overfishing is to a large extent due to transshipments at sea, which are insufficiently 
monitored. An overfishing capacity of 50 percent or more is thus not out of line for the 
Russian fleet. In addition there is probably some discarding of fish at sea, but apparently 
much less than the overfished quantity being landed (Riksrevisjonen, 2007, pp. 38 and 
46). 
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Table 8: Northeast Arctic cod: agreed quota (ths. tonnes) and overfishing (Norwegian estimates) in 
thousand tonnes and percent of agreed quota. Source: ICES (2007), Table 3.1a and Institute of Marine 
Research (2006), pp. 48-52. 
 
 Agreed quota Total stock Quota as 
share of stock 
Overfishing Overfishing 
(percent) 
2002 395 1549 26 90 23 
2003 395 1612 25 115 29 
2004 486 1572 31 90 19 
2005 485 1552 32 166 34 
2006 471 1462 32 127 27 
 
 
Table 8 shows the total overfishing, according to Norwegian estimates. According to this, 
the overfishing of the Northeast Arctic cod has been 20-30 percent of the agreed quota in 
recent years. Above (see Table 3) we found that overfishing of 25 percent would result in 
a rent loss of 6-10 percent in the Schaefer case, depending on fishing costs. This is a 
substantial loss, albeit less in percentage terms than the overfishing itself. 
 
Table 8 also shows the target exploitation rate, defined as the agreed quota in percent of 
the total stock biomass. This has in recent years been about 30 percent and thus 
comparable to what we found for the zero cost case in Table 3 above. This would be 
near-optimal if the cost per unit of fish is independent of the stock size. It is also possible, 
and indeed likely, that the two countries are uninterested in rent maximization and more 
concerned with maximizing the total catch over the long term, in which case an 
exploitation rate of 30 percent would be about right. In that case the appropriate measure 
of loss due to overfishing would not be rent but the expected total catch per year. The last 
line in Table 3 provides an estimate of this, in present value terms, as the rent at zero cost 
and given price is equal to the catch volume. According to the last line in Table 3 the loss 
of catch from 25 percent overfishing would be about 6 percent, well below the 
overfishing percentage. 
 
As to the probability of detecting overfishing, only about 1 percent of all Norwegian 
landing events of cod 2003-2005 north of the 62
nd
 parallel were controlled by the 
Directorate of Fisheries. This low percentage is due in part to the multitude of small boats 
engaged in the fishery. The large boats are controlled more often, and so 4-23 percent of 
the quantity landed in the said period was subject to control, varying between areas 
(Riksrevisjonen, 2007, p. 84). If we weight these percentages by the share of the areas in 
total landings, we find that 12 percent of all catches are subject to control. With our 
simplifying assumption of a homogenous fleet this would be the probability of being 
detected if overfishing, provided controls are random. In reality controls are not random; 
apparently there are some boats that are considered more likely to overfish than others, 
and both the Directorate of Fisheries and the Coast Guard have identified such boats and 
direct their activities more towards them than other boats whose skippers are believed to 
be more law-abiding. Hence the probability of catching those who overfish may be 
somewhat greater than this. Furthermore, the fact that once caught a skipper can look 
forward to more frequent controls can be seen as an additional punishment, given that 
controls probably cause some inconvenience. Since the said probability pertains only to 
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each fishing trip, the probability that one single boat will be controlled at least once each 
year is much higher and is in fact equal to one for some categories of boats 
(Riksrevisjonen, 2007, p. 83). In addition to the controls by the Directorate of Fisheries 
there are controls by the Coast Guard. Most of these controls are, however, aimed at 
foreign fishing vessels, and those that are aimed at Norwegian vessels are typically 
followed up by controls in harbor by the Directorate of Fisheries, so the controls by the 
latter probably give a roughly correct picture of the control activity aimed at Norwegian 
vessels. 
 
Table 9: Overview of court cases 1994-2007 involving overfishing of cod and similar species by 
Norwegian boats (other court cases, not included here, involve breach of other types of regulations or 
foreign boats) 
 
Type of offense Value of catch Fines 
Incorrect logbook 360,000 360,000 for the firm and 15,000 
for the skipper 
Incorrect logbook (underreporting 
of 20-30 percent of cod and other 
types of fish) 
Not specified Fine of firm not reported, fine of 
skipper: 14,000 
Incorrect logbook 110,000 (underreported catch) 60,000 for the firm and 10,000 
for the skipper. 
Landings from Boat X reported 
as from Boat Y 
138,000 80,000 for one skipper  and 
117,000 for the other 
Landings from Boat X reported 
as from Boat Y 
300,000 50,000 for each skipper 
Incorrect logbook (37 percent 
underreporting) 
42,000 62,000 for the firm and 15,000 
for the skipper 
Incorrect logbook 1,040,000 400,000 and 10,000 for each of 
two skippers involved 
Incorrect logbook Unreported 25,000 for the firm and 8,000 for 
the skipper 
 
The deterrence, as already stated, depends on the fine imposed on those who overfish. 
Only about 5 percent of all controls have uncovered any illegal activity (Riksrevisjonen, 
2007, p. 85). Of those, most are minor and result only in a written reprimand. If serious 
enough, the infraction is reported to the police, which investigates and refers the case to 
the attorney general if the evidence is strong enough. These are the kind of breaches that 
most need to be deterred and which we had in mind in the exposition above. The offices 
of the attorney general in the two northernmost counties of Norway have assembled a 
report of the court verdicts on various breaches of the Norwegian fisheries regulations for 
the period 1994-2007. These court cases stem both from the Supreme Court and lower 
courts. There are only a few cases of serious overfishing by Norwegian vessels in this 
report. These cases involve incorrect entries in the logbook and falsified reporting of 
catches on landings or transaction documents. An overview of the cases is presented in 
Table 9. 
 
Two of the cases in Table 9 involve transactions which in a different regulatory regime 
would not have been breaches at all; that is, a transfer of an unused quota from one boat 
to another. Because leasing of boat quotas is not permitted in the Norwegian regulatory 
system, this constitutes a breach of regulations and is apparently quite harshly punished. 
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In the remaining six cases fines were imposed, both on the firm and the skipper involved. 
The fine imposed on the firm is by far the highest and ranges from 40 to 150 percent of 
the value of the total landings. 
 
Is the Norwegian enforcement activity worthwhile? Hardly, if we take into account the 
results of Section 6, which showed that the best Norwegian reply to Russian overfishing 
would be to also overfish. But what if the compliance on the Russian side were of a 
similar magnitude as on the Norwegian side? To analyze that we need to look at the costs 
of the enforcement activities and compare them with the rents saved by the enforcement 
activity. It is not possible to provide but a very rough estimate of what the enforcement 
activity costs per unit of probability of detection. We go about this as follows: We take 
the budget of the Directorate of Fisheries and find the cost of enforcement by multiplying 
by the fraction of man-years devoted to enforcement activities (20 percent). Enforcement 
in the demersal fisheries, of which the cod fishery is by far the most important and often 
occurs jointly with fishing of other demersal species, probably accounts for well over a 
half of all enforcement costs, because of the large number of boats in this fishery, but we 
shall use one-half as a rough estimate, providing a lower bound of the enforcement costs. 
To this we add the part of the costs of the Coast Guard which can be attributed to controls 
of Norwegian vessels. About 70 percent of the expenses of the coast guard are for 
monitoring fisheries, and of that again about 40 percent is directed at Norwegian boats. 
 
Table 10: Calibrating enforcement costs for Northeast Arctic cod. 
 
Cost of Directorate of Fisheries 2006 (mill. kroner) 286 
Cost of Coast Guard 2006 (mill. kroner) 810 
0.5x(0.2x286+0.7x0.4x810) of above 142 
Maximum and minimum value of landings of demersal fish in Norway 2004-07 (mill. kroner) 4,400; 6,200 
Enforcement costs in percent of above 3.2; 2.3 
Average annual catch of Northeast Arctic cod 2003-2006 (ths. tonnes) 600 
3 percent of above 18 
 
The resulting cost estimate is shown in Table 10 and amounts to about 140 million 
kroner. This is roughly 3 percent of the landed value of cod and similar species. Total 
annual landings of Northeast Arctic cod averaged about 600,000 tonnes in 2003-2006, so 
in terms of landings the enforcement costs amounted to 18,000 tonnes, taking the 
Norwegian enforcement costs as indicative of enforcement costs for the entire stock. As 
stated above, the risk of being caught if overfishing seems close to 12 percent, on the 
basis that 12 percent of the quantity caught is controlled and provided that the control is 
random. This produces a cost per unit probability of 150 (thousand tonnes). 
Obviously these cost calibrations are subject to uncertainty. There are three major types 
of uncertainty involved. First, are the Norwegian enforcement costs indicative of what 
would obtain in an efficiently enforced management of the entire stock? No one really 
knows, but there is no better option as a first approximation. Second, the costs listed 
above are estimates made on the basis of accounting costs. We shall deal with this by 
calculating critical costs, i.e., how high the cost would have to be in order to overturn our 
conclusions. Third, the cost per unit of probability depends critically on the probability of 
detection produced by the enforcement activities. We only have a very rough estimate of 
this, but as it turns out, the results are not sensitive to this, provided the fines are set high 
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enough to deter all overfishing. If the probability of detection produced by the 
enforcement activity is higher than we have estimated the cost per unit of probability 
would be correspondingly lower. What is sensitive to the probability of detection 
produced by the enforcement activity is the fine necessary to deter all overfishing; a 
lower probability of detection must be compensated by a correspondingly higher fine, in 
order to avoid a positive expected gain from overfishing (cf. Equation [3]). 
 
Table 11: Rent gain per year (percent), necessary fine to prevent overfishing, and enforcement cost per unit 
probability critical for making enforcement worthwhile. Cost per unit probability: 150; probability of 
detecting overfishing: 12 percent.   
 
Overfishing 
capacity 
(%) 
c = 2500 c = 1400 c = 0 
Gain Fine Critical cost Gain Fine Critical cost Gain Fine Critical cost 
10 -10.8 270 22 -2.2 530 87 0.4 1030 177 
25 -4.0 650 107 10.1 1300 410 9.8 2650 698 
50 13.9 1290 278 58.9 2480 1206 35.9 5360 1769 
 
Table 11 shows the results of running the model with a 12 percent probability of 
detecting overfishing at a cost of 150 per unit probability, for the cost levels shown in 
Table 3 for the Schaefer function. In the high cost case, which implies a rent of about 25 
percent of catch value, overfishing capacity has to be quite large (well over 25 percent) in 
order to make the enforcement activities worthwhile. In the low cost case, implying that 
rent is about a half of revenues, overfishing capacity has to exceed 10 percent to be 
worthwhile. Ignoring costs, deterring an overfishing capacity of 10 percent is just barely 
worthwhile. Table 11 also shows the cost critical for making enforcement worthwhile. 
These numbers are per unit probability of detection and should be compared to the above 
estimate of 150. This critical cost exceeds the estimated cost by a wide margin if the 
overfishing capacity is as high as 50 percent. The critical cost is, however, much lower 
than the estimated cost if the overfishing capacity is only 10 percent, except when fishing 
costs are ignored. 
  
The probability of detection produced by the enforcement activities does not matter, as 
long as there is no restriction on the fines to be imposed; a low probability of detection 
can always be compensated for by a high fine. Table 11 shows the fine necessary to deter 
all overfishing and thus to maximize the gains from enforcement. Some of these fines are 
problematic, from the point of view that the fines should not be too far out of line with 
the damage caused by overfishing. In the high cost case the annual catch is about 550 
(thousand tonnes) on the average when there is no overfishing. The necessary fine with 
an overfishing capacity of 50 percent is more than twice that, and more than four times 
the average annual rent (note that the fine is calculated for the entire fleet on an annual 
basis). In the low cost case the average catch per year is about 700, and in the costless 
case about 750, and the necessary fine to deter all overfishing with a 50 percent capacity 
is 3.5 versus 7 times that. The highest of the fines in Table 11 thus seem out of line with 
what would be deemed reasonable; the highest fine recorded in the court cases reported in 
Table 9 is about one and a half times the catch value. If the enforcement activity results in 
lower probability of detection than we have assumed, the fines would have to be higher 
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still, in order to prevent overfishing. Reducing the probability of detection by a quarter 
(from 0.12 to 0.09) would raise the necessary fine by one third (cf. Equation  [3]). For an 
overfishing capacity of 50 percent we would, in the intermediate cost case (c = 1400), 
need a fine of 3,300, which is six times the average annual catch. 
 
Table 12: Results with and without enforcement when the unit cost of fish is independent of stock size. VN: 
rent per year with no enforcement, VE: rent per year with enforcement. Probability of enforcement: 0.12, 
enforcement cost per unit probability: 150.  
 
vc fc 
Fleet 
capacity  Fine VN VE 
Critical 
cost 
0.6 0.15 770 1610 -5.6 161.7 1544 
0.75 0.15 740 910 -13.5 51.8 695 
0.8 0.18 690 600 2.5 -47 90 
 
Table 12 shows the gains or losses from enforcement for the case when the unit cost of 
fish is insensitive to the stock size. The last line in the table shows operating costs and 
capital costs close to the ones observed for the Norwegian trawler fleet (cf. Table 4 and 
accompanying text). The column entitled fleet capacity shows the capacity that would be 
optimal at these costs, given an effectively enforced total quota (cf. Table 4). This results 
in overfishing when the total allowable catch is less than the available fishing capacity, so 
if overfishing is sufficiently profitable for the individual firm, the actual capacity could 
be greater than this. We see that with these high costs there is a small positive rent per 
year. Enforcement would result in a lower rent, because overfishing does not happen very 
often; the fleet capacity is well below the average annual quota and exceeds the actual 
quota only infrequently. Yet a fine that exceeds the catch value at fully used capacity is 
necessary to deter overfishing. 
 
With lower costs, the average annual rent in the absence of enforcement turns negative.
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The reason is that overfishing depletes the stock and typically leads to extinction within 
the hundred year period. Exactly when this happens depends on the random 
environmental variable; when the combined effect of overfishing and unlucky draws of 
nature deplete the stock below the catch capacity of the fleet it will go extinct. 
Enforcement averts this and produces a positive annual rent, thus doing better than 
paying for itself. The critical enforcement cost is in these two cases much higher than the 
estimated cost of enforcement. The fines necessary to deter overfishing are high, 
however; in the low cost case (first line in Table 12) more than double the gross catch 
value with a full use of fleet capacity and about ten times the rent per year.  
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 Note that the present value of rents would be positive (cf. Table 4), but the numbers in Table 11 refer to 
undiscounted rent per year. The fishery starts out with a large and viable stock and it will take some time 
before it crashes, due to overfishing and adverse environmental effects.  The negative numbers are due to 
fixed costs assumed to accrue even if the stock has been depleted. If the stock crashes early in the 100-year 
period much of these could be avoided, but we have not considered that here. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
There is no doubt that fishing in excess of an optimal quota is economically wasteful, 
although the rent loss may be less in relative terms than the overfishing activity itself. But 
this does not mean that overfishing should be prevented at any cost. The cost of 
prevention must be compared to the benefits it provides, just as in any other economic 
activity. Provided that criminals are governed by the expected value of their activities, 
preventive activities could be kept at a minimum by sufficiently harsh punishments. 
Punishments are, however, likely to be constrained by what is perceived as a reasonable 
proportionality between the damage caused and the punishment inflicted. The punishment 
in the Norwegian court cases reported here certainly is greater than the individual gain 
from overfishing; fines for overfishing have typically been as high as or greater than the 
value of the gross value of the catch, which is well above the gain, since to obtain the 
latter we would have to subtract all costs. But in order to deter, punishments must be 
greater than the gain. 
 
How serious the effects of overfishing are likely to be depends critically on whether or 
not the unit cost of fish is sensitive to the size of the fish stock. When the unit cost of fish 
is independent of the fish stock, the result is altogether more sinister than with the 
Schaefer function. Overfishing will occur when fish quotas are smaller than the capacity 
of the fleet, which is particularly damaging, as the rate of exploitation, including the 
overfishing, will be higher the smaller the stock is. The result is that sooner or later the 
stock will be totally depleted. How soon depends on the degree of overcapacity and how 
bad the draws of nature turn out to be. Since extinction of fish stocks is about as rare as 
fishing beyond quota is common it is perhaps tempting to dismiss this case as unrealistic, 
that sooner or later the unit cost of fish will start to rise and provide protection against a 
total depletion. The point is, however, that this might kick in fairly late; over a wide range 
the unit cost of fish could be only weakly related to the size of the stock. A weak 
relationship of this kind was one factor behind the Northern cod debacle in the early 
1990s and the stock is still commercially if not biologically extinct. 
 
Looking specifically at the fishery for the Northeast Arctic cod we find that the 
Norwegian enforcement activities are likely to be close to what is warranted, provided 
that the overall enforcement is adequate. This, unfortunately, is not the case; there is no 
doubt that the enforcement of the Russian quota leaves much to be desired. It was shown 
above that the best Norwegian reply to this would be no enforcement at all and an 
overfishing of the Norwegian quota as well. Nevertheless the Norwegian government 
persists in its enforcement activities. This could be rational, if it is conceived as an 
example acting together with other persuasive arguments to convince the other part to 
mend its ways. Time will show whether this is a fruitful approach or just wishful 
thinking. 
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